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INTRODUCTION
In June 2003, Jennifer Lu and eight other young adults of color filed
a lawsuit against Abercrombie & Fitch (A&F) alleging that the clothing
retailer had engaged in race, color, and national origin discrimination by
refusing, among other things, to hire qualified African Americans, Latinos/as,
and Asians to work on its sales floors as "Brand Representatives."2 The
plaintiffs allegedly did not have the "A&F Look," a "virtually all-white
image" that Abercrombie used to market its clothing.3 When the company
did hire people of color, the plaintiffs asserted that A&F "channel[ed] them
to stock room and overnight shift positions and away from visible sales
positions, keeping them out of the public eye." 4 Over time, the lawsuit
expanded as other A&F applicants and employees across the United States
joined the original plaintiffs. As a result of work done by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, private law firms, and a coalition of
civil rights groups, in November 2004, the lawsuit settled with A&F
agreeing: (1) to pay $50 million dollars in damages and fees; and (2) to
implement a variety of measures designed to diversify its workforce and to
end the company's discriminatory practices.5
' Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Research for this essay was
supported in part by a gift to the Duke Law School from the Eugene T. Bost, Jr.
Research Professorship of the Cannon Charitable Trust No. 3.
2 Complaint at 1, Gonzalez v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 03-2817 (N.D. Cal.
June 17, 2003), available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/caseissue/AbercrombieComplaint.pdf.
3Id.
4Id.
' See Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC
Agrees to Landmark Resolution of Discrimination Case Against Abercrombie &
Fitch (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
newsroom/release/ 1-18-04.cfm (summarizing settlement terms).
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Had Jennifer Lu and her fellow plaintiffs sought employment with
Abercrombie & Fitch or a similar retailer forty years earlier, they would have
been without legal options under U.S. federal law. In 1963, policies like
Abercrombie & Fitch's were prevalent in the United States, and employers
were free to exclude women and people of color from employment
opportunities at will.6 Indeed, people of color and women were discouraged
from even applying for employment in some sectors of the economy due to
the ubiquitous presence of employment ads, often found in classified sections
of newspapers, seeking individuals of a specific race or gender.
7
This state of affairs changed on July 2, 1964, when in the midst of
Freedom Summer8 and at the height of the Civil Rights Movement, the U.S.
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA of 1964). If Brown v.
Board of Education9 had removed the first pillar in the fortress of Jim Crow 10
by invalidating the doctrine of separate but equal, then the CRA augured its
ultimate destruction. The civil rights legislation was hard won, requiring the
courageous efforts of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the National
Women's Party, and countless other organizations and individuals whose
sacrifice should not be forgotten. The Act passed after three contentious
months of debate in the U.S. Senate, including a 54-day filibuster, and with
sizable opposition from southern representatives who feared the effects of
racial integration." This fear was illustrated in U.S. Senator Richard
Russell's (GA) infamous statement that "[w]e will resist to the bitter end any
measure or any movement which would have a tendency to bring about social
6 H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at 26-30 (1963).
7 Nicholas Pedriana & Amanda Abraham, Now You See Them, Now You Don't:
The Legal Field and Newspaper Desegregation of Sex-Segregated Help Wanted
Ads 1965-75, 31 LAW& SOC. INQUIRY 905, 906 (2006).
8 Freedom Summer refers to a famous campaign undertaken during the summer of
1964 in the Deep South to eliminate laws and other tactics designed to deny
African Americans the right to vote. James Chaney (an African American from
Mississippi), Andrew Goodman and Michael Schwemer (two northerners of
Jewish heritage) were killed by members of the Ku Klux Klan for their protest
activity during Freedom Summer.
I Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (invalidating state-sanctioned
segregation in public schools).
10 Jim Crow refers to that era in U.S. history, from approximately 1876 through
roughly 1964, which was defined by laws and social practices mandating racial
segregation in most aspects of American life.
I U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., The Road to Civil Rights: The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Oct. 17, 2013), available at
http://www.ftiwa.dot.gov/highwayhistory/road/s34.cfm.
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equality and intermingling and amalgamation of the races in our (Southern)
states," 12 and U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond's (SC) observation that these
so-called Civil Rights Proposals, which the President has
sent to Capitol Hill for enactment into law, are
unconstitutional, unnecessary, unwise and extend beyond
the realm of reason. This is the worst civil rights package
ever presented to the Congress and is reminiscent of the
Reconstruction proposals and actions of the radical
Republican Congress.' 
3
At the time of its enactment, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the
most comprehensive piece of civil rights legislation in U.S. history. The Act
was wide-ranging, prohibiting discrimination in voting, public
accommodations, public facilities, education, employment, and federally
assisted programs. A centerpiece of this landmark legislation was Title VII,
14
which bars discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin. 5
Over the years, Title VII has been, in some ways, interpreted broadly
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet, in many respects, interpretations of the
statute have not kept pace with the changing nature of discrimination in the
modem workplace. This essay examines the evolution of Title VII and three
contemporary challenges to U.S. employment discrimination law. Part I
briefly describes several ways in which the statute has been expanded. Part
II then turns to three issues that underscore conceptual limitations with recent
interpretations of Title VII and with U.S. anti-discrimination law more
generally: (1) sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination; (2)
implicit bias, structural discrimination, and the requirement of intent; and (3)
formalism. Examination of these matters demonstrates how U.S. courts have
addressed three highly contested issues with which all legal systems must
contend: (1) what constitutes discrimination; (2) upon what basis does one
determine which classes or groups are protected; and (3) what are the ultimate
goals of anti-discrimination law. I conclude that although there has been
progress, recent cases touching upon these issues pose considerable
12Id.
13 1963 Year in Review: Civil Rights Bill, UNITED PRESS INT'L, available at
http://www.upi.com/Archives/Audio/Events-of- 1963/Civil-Rights-Bill! (transcript
including Senator Thurmond's statement).
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2013).
'5 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-633a
(2013), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(2013), contain similar prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of age and
ability.
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challenges for the pursuit of corrective and distributive justice in the United
States.
I. TITLE VII's EXPANSION
Title VII forms the heart of U.S. employment discrimination law. The
statute bars intentional discrimination targeted at specific individuals and
groups' 6 as well as the use of neutral criteria that disparately affect protected
groups. 17 For example, Title VII would render illegal a city's refusal to
promote a woman to police chief if that refusal were based upon a belief that
police officers will not follow or respect a female chief.'8 Title VII would
also prohibit a policy requiring that police officers possess a four-year college
degree (i.e., a neutral criterion that might produce a disparate impact on racial
minorities) unless the police department can show that having advanced
educational credentials is necessary to perform the job. 19
Over the years, Title VII has been, in some ways, interpreted
expansively by the U.S. Supreme Court to cover forms of discrimination that
may not have been anticipated by or within the contemplation of Congress at
the time the CRA of 1964 was enacted. For example, Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination initially focused on the wholesale exclusion of
women from the workplace or their segregation within certain occupations. 20
Title VII challenged those who believed that a woman's place was solely in
the home or that women could be teachers, librarians, nurses, and waitresses,
but not police officers, firefighters, doctors, lawyers, and mechanics. As Title
VII opened up employment spaces that were previously off limits to women
and people of color, second generation discrimination emerged,2' including
sexual and racial harassment and more nuanced forms of racial and gender
stereotyping. Thus, while women and people of color were allowed into
previously segregated spaces, once there they were frequently subject to
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2013); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973) (establishing the initial framework for proving cases of disparate treatment
or intentional discrimination based on circumstantial evidence).
'7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) and 2000e-2(k) (2013); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), discussed infra at page 21.
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2013).
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
20 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458,465-68 (2001).
21 See generally id. (examining internal workplace structures and norms that serve
to exclude women and people of color).
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hostile and abusive treatment, denied opportunities for advancement, and
required to perform their race or gender in certain prescribed ways.
Fortunately, due to the groundbreaking work of scholars like
Catharine MacKinnon, "sex" in Title VII has been read to include
prohibitions against sexual harassment 22 and to embrace, to some extent,
gender stereotyping.23 Thus, not only are women no longer automatically
excluded from certain workplaces, they are also no longer forced to suffer
(without some legal recourse) the indignity of unwelcome sexual demands at
work or to endure workplaces permeated with sexually demeaning language
and images. In addition, confident and assertive women need not fear that
they will be told to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, and enroll
in charm school" 24 in order to be considered for promotion. This is not to say
that women are no longer subject to discriminatory workplace restrictions
and hostility. They are. The above interventions, however, have enabled more
women to seek redress in these circumstances.
In addition to arguing for a broad interpretation of "sex" under Title
VII, since 1964 U.S. scholars have also pressed the courts to acknowledge
and to accept that individuals may be subject to discrimination on multiple
bases. For example, an employer may treat an Asian woman differently from
a White woman or an Asian man because the Asian woman is both a woman
and a person of color. Thus, she may be subject to stereotypes to which White
women and Asian men are immune. 25 Prominent U.S. legal scholars such as
22 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (Yale Univ. 1979). See also Menitor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (recognizing quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment claims).
23 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing claim based
on gender stereotyping).241 d. at 235 (recognizing claim of a woman who was told that her chances of being
promoted to partnership would increase if she would "take a course at charm
school" and "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry").
25 For example, Asian women are sometimes stereotyped as "passive, repressed,
naYve lotus blossoms; sexually exotic or seductively mysterious geisha; or devious
and wicked dragon ladies." Neither Asian men nor White women are generally
subject to these stereotypes. Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin
Color and Identity Performance Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 657, n. 41 (2010) (citing Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and
Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII
Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race. Gender and National Origin, 37 B.C.
L. REV. 771 (1996)).
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Kimberld Crenshaw and Angela Harris 26 have argued persuasively that such
intersectional claims ought to be acknowledged. Still other scholars have
urged courts to consider the ways in which persons are differently situated
within protected categories and how intra-group differences, like skin color
or various identity performances, may be used to harm subsets of workers.
Thus, employers who hire African Americans but prefer lighter-toned
African Americans over darker-toned African Americans may find their
decision-making subject to challenge under Title VII's prohibition against
color discrimination. 27 Similarly, employers who prefer people of color who
consciously or subconsciously cloak or downplay their racial identity as
opposed to highlighting it, or women who embrace conventional notions of
femininity as opposed to those who reject such notions, may also find
themselves on the wrong end of a lawsuit. 28 All of these claims, 29 and
26 See Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991);
Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581 (1990).
27 See Trina Jones, Shades ofBrown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L. J. 1487
(2000) (examining colorism within African-American communities); Trina Jones,
The Significance of Skin Color in Asian and Asian-American Communities: Initial
Reflections, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1105 (2013) (examining colorism in Asian and
Asian-American communities).
28 See generally DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?:
RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013); KENJI YOSHINO,
COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006). Thus, employers
may prefer African Americans with racial performances more similar to that of
President Obama than that of Al Sharpton or Jesse Jackson. Indeed, Senator Harry
Reid and Vice President (then Senator) Joe Biden's observations about President
Obama's appeal during the 2008 Democratic primaries lend support to the salience
of identity performance. Few will forget Biden's statement, "I mean, you got the
first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a
nice-looking guy... I mean, that's a storybook, man" or Senator Reid's observation
that the United States was ready to embrace a Black presidential candidate,
especially Obama who was a "light-skinned" African American "with no Negro
dialect, unless he wanted to have one." JOHN HEILEMANN & MARK HALPERIN,
GAME CHANGE: OBAMA AND THE CLINTONS, MCCAIN AND PALIN, AND THE RACE
OF A LIFETIME 36 (2010) (recording Reid's comments); Jason Horowitz, Biden
Unbound: Lays into Clinton, Obama, Edwards, N.Y. OBSERVER (Feb. 5, 2007,
12:00 AM), http://observer.com/2007/02/biden-unbound-lays-into-clinton-obama-
edwards (documenting Biden's comments).
29 As noted earlier, even in areas where Title VII has been interpreted broadly,
there has been pushback. Harassing practices that many women find hostile and
offensive are still too commonly viewed by men as appropriate. See Gary Langer,
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employment discrimination lawsuits in general,3" are incredibly difficult for
plaintiffs to win. These theoretical developments in U.S. anti-discrimination
law are nonetheless important because they reflect a recognition, on some
level, of both the complexity of social identities and the nuanced ways in
which discrimination occurs.
Although Title VII's development has been slow, and not necessarily
linear, the statute, coupled with the Equal Pay Act,3 ' the Pregnancy
One in Four U.S. Women Reports Workplace Harassment, ABCNEWS.GO.COM
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/201 1/1 1/one-in-four-u-s-
women-reports-workplace-harassment/. Plaintiffs who assert intersectional claims
based upon multiple factors are likely to be accused of whining. And proving intra-
group claims will likely be difficult as employers may successfully argue that they
are not discriminating, for example, on the basis of race if they hire some African
Americans (even if those who are hired have a preferred skin tone or racial
performance). For additional examination of these issues, see Trina Jones, Intra-
group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance Discrimination,
34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 657 (2010) (examining difficulties faced by
plaintiffs alleging intra-group discrimination). However, with at least a doctrinal
basis for bringing these claims, one hopes and expects that over time material and
normative changes will occur.
30 A voluminous literature documents both plaintiffs' low success rates in these
cases and explores possible reasons for these outcomes. See, e.g., Kevin M.
Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in
Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) (finding that employment
discrimination cases settle less often than other types of cases and that plaintiffs
in employment discrimination cases are less likely to win than other plaintiffs);
Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 7
EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547, 566 (2003) (showing that employment
discrimination plaintiffs fare poorly on appeal, with a 7 percent reversal rate when
defendants win at trial compared to a 42 percent reversal rate when plaintiffs win at
trial); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 560-61 (2001) (showing that plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases win only 18.7 percent of the time in bench trials, compared
with success rates of 43.6 percent and 41.8 percent for insurance and personal
injury cases, respectively); Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed.
Judicial Ctr., to Hon. Michael Baylson, Estimates of Summary Judgment Activity
in Fiscal Year 2006 (June 15, 2007) (showing that in 2006 the national average for
summary judgment grants resulting in termination of cases was 70 percent in civil
rights cases and 73 percent in employment discrimination cases-the highest for
federal civil cases).
31 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2013).
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Discrimination Act,32 and the Family and Medical Leave Act,33 has produced
considerable change in the United States over the last fifty years. These
statutory interventions, and the normative shifts to which they have
contributed, have led to workplaces and employment standards that look very
different from what U.S. workers experienced five decades ago. In 1960, 37.7
percent of women participated in the U.S. labor force.34 In 2012, that number
had risen to 57.7 percent. 35 In addition, the percentage of doctors, lawyers,
accountants, professors, U.S. senators, representatives, governors, and
Forbes 500 CEOs who are female has increased significantly. In 1960, nearly
two-thirds of women in the U.S. workforce held clerical, service, or sales
positions and only 13 percent held professional positions.36 In 2010, 40.6
percent of employed women held managerial and professional positions.37 In
addition, in 1963, women earned 59 cents 38 on the dollar compared to what a
White man earned. Today, that figure is about 80 cents.39
The above advances are critically important as employment is
essential to the economic well-being and dignity of employees and their
families. Yet, considerable obstacles remain to equality of opportunity.
Indeed, the glass and marble ceilings have yet to shatter. Although more
women are in managerial and professional positions than in the past, they are
still underrepresented in the highest echelons of business. 40 Moreover, racial
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2013).
33 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2013).
34 NATIONAL EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, Fifty Years After the Equal Pay Act:
Assessing the Past, Taking Stock of the Future 10 (June 2013).
35 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Women of
Working Age, available at http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/recentfacts.htm#rates.
36 NATIONAL EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, supra note 34, at 6.
37 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, Women in the Labor
Force in 2010, available at http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/Qf-laborforce-
10.htm.
38 NATIONAL EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, supra note 34, at 6.
39 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Women's
Earnings as a Percent of Men's in 2012, available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2012/ted_201201 10.htm. The data are more alarming
for people of color. For example, in 1963, Black families earned 55 cents for every
dollar earned by a White family. Michael A. Fletcher, Fifty Years after March on
Washington, Economic Gap between Blacks, Whites Persists, WASH. POST (Aug.
28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/50-years-after-the-
march-the-economic-racial-gap-persists/2013/08/27/9081 fo 12-0e66-11 e3-8cdd-
bcdc09410972_story.html. In 2011, that figure was 66 cents. Id.
40 See Claire Cain Miller, An Elusive Jackpot: Riches Come to Women as CEOs,
but Few Get There, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2014),
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and sexual harassment are continuing problems and disturbing levels of job
segregation remain not only by gender, but by race. For example, while 34.8
percent of employed White men hold managerial or professional positions,
the same is true for only 15.3 percent of employed Latino men and 23.5
percent of employed Black men.41 The percentages by race of employed
workers in managerial or professional positions are similarly stratified for
women: 41.5 percent of White women compared to 24.1 percent of Latina
women and 33.8 percent of Black women.42 The unemployment rate of
African Americans has also been consistently double that of Whites.43
ii. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
As demonstrated in Part I, Title VII has evolved over the last five
decades and has improved the employment experiences of covered groups.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/08/business/riches-come-to-women-as-ceos-but-
few-get-there.html?_r-0 (noting that women represent only 5.5 percent of the 200
highest paid CEOs in the United States); Bryce Covert, The Record-Breaking
Number of Women in CEO Jobs is Still Pretty Pitiful, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 22,
2014), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/09/22/3 570450/women-ceo-highest-
share/ (noting that while women hold 5 percent of CEO positions at Fortune 500
companies, that number is still "very small when compared to women's 47 percent
share of the overall workforce and 38 percent share of management jobs").
41 UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Statistics,
Earnings and Employment by Occupation, Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 2010,
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/201 1/ted_20110914.htm.
42 Id. In addition to workforce stratification by race, gender divisions continue to
exist. See NATIONAL EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE, supra note 34, at 6 (noting that in
2012, women were still "much more likely to enter occupations where the majority
of workers [were] female, including healthcare, education and human service
fields" and that "over half of all women continue[d] to be employed in lower-
paying sales, service and administrative support positions").
41 See Drew Desilver, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Black Unemployment Rate is
Consistently Twice that of Whites (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/08/21/through-good-times-and-bad-
black-unemployment-is-consistently-double-that-of-whites/; UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Economic News Release, Table
A-2. Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Race, Sex, andAge,
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t02.htm (noting that in
December 2014, the unemployment rate for Whites was 4.6 percent, for African
Americans it was 10.2 percent, and for Asians it was 4.2 percent). See also UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Economic News
Release, Table A-3. Employment Status of the Hispanic or Latino Population by
Sex and Age, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t03.htm (noting
that in December 2014, the unemployment rate for Hispanics was 6.4 percent).
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But challenges remain and efforts to address some of these challenges may
be hampered by the failure of U.S. law to keep pace conceptually with the
changing nature of discrimination in the modem workplace. This Part
examines three areas that highlight ways in which that law has lagged: (1)
LGBTQ 44 rights; (2) implicit bias, structural discrimination, and the
requirement of intent; and (3) formalism. It then briefly considers why U.S.
anti-discrimination law has, in some areas, seemingly reached a standstill.
A. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Despite substantial advocacy for the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) persons, neither U.S. constitutional law nor
U.S. statutory law afford adequate protection to these individuals.45 In the
realm of U.S. constitutional law, there has been incremental progress since
1986, when the U.S. Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick upheld the
constitutionality of a Georgia law that criminalized certain sexual acts
between same-sex individuals. 46 In a 5-4 opinion, the Court stated that the
U.S. Constitution conferred neither "a right of privacy that extends to
homosexual sodomy" nor a "fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy." 47 In reaching this determination, the justices in the majority
observed that they were not "inclined to take a more expansive view of [the
Court's] authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due
Process Clause," noting that "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.,
48
4' Although I reference lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer persons
through use of the acronym LGBTQ, it is important to note that the analysis herein
focuses primarily on sexual orientation. Sexual orientation, in the simplest sense of
the term, means the gender to whom a person is sexually and/or romantically
attracted. Sexual orientation should not be confused with gender identity, which
broadly refers to a person's internal sense of being male, female, or somewhere
else along a gendered continuum and the expressive activity or behavior that may
accompany that person's sense of identity.
4" Although this essay focuses primarily on statutory protections in the
employment arena, it is important to keep trends elsewhere in the law in mind as
they may affect the development and scope of statutory protections. The analysis
in this section is therefore not limited to Title VII and employment.
46 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
47 1d. at 190-91.
48 Id. at 194.
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In 2003, however, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed this stance in
Lawrence v. Texas.49 In that case, the Court invalidated a Texas sodomy law
that criminalized same-sex sexual activity. The Court noted:
[this case] involve[s] two adults who, with full and
mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.
The State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.
Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government. "It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which
the government may not enter." The Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual."
In 2013, the Supreme Court again decided a case involving the rights
of sexual minorities in United States v. Windsor.5 1 In that case, the Court
49 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
5 Id. at 578 (internal citations omitted). In a sharp turnaround from Bowers, the
Court recognized that constitutional principles are not fixed, but rather evolve,
observing:
[those] who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment ... knew
times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can
see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for
greater freedom.
Id.
51 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court also decided
Hollingsworth v. Perry, a case challenging a ballot initiative (Proposition 8) which
provided that only marriages between a man and a woman would be valid and
recognized in California. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). In Perry,
the lower courts had found Proposition 8 to be illegal. The Supreme Court declined
to decide the case on its merits, finding that the parties who were appealing the
lower court rulings lacked "standing" to pursue the case before the Supreme Court.
The effect of the Court's ruling was to reinstate the lower courts' determinations
that Proposition 8 was invalid.
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considered key provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), a federal
statute that defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman and, in
effect, rendered same-sex couples ineligible for certain federal benefits. In
invalidating parts of DOMA, the Court determined that
the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law
are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex
marriage. This requires the Court to hold, as it now does,
that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the
liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution.52
Importantly, in Windsor, instead of banning all state-imposed prohibitions on
same-sex marriage, the Court merely extended protection to those same-sex
couples whose marriages were legal under their state's laws. Thus, the Court
declined to address whether a constitutional right to same-sex marriage
existed, leaving that issue for another day.
That day came on June 26, 2015, when, in one of the most positive
developments for the rights of sexual minorities to date, the U.S. Supreme
Court announced its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. 3 In Obergefell, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had upheld Ohio's prohibition against same-
sex marriage, thus creating a split in the circuit courts regarding the power of
states to ban same-sex marriages (and to refuse recognition of same-sex
marriages performed elsewhere). 4 On review, the Supreme Court found such
52 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. The Court also noted that "the liberty protected by
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition
against denying to any person the equal protection of the law." Id.
51 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Before Obergefell, the Supreme Court declined to
consider a number of cases that would have offered the Court an opportunity to
clarify the legal status of same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Bostic, 760 F.3d
352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014) (declining to hear a Fourth
Circuit decision supporting marriage equality in Virginia); Bogan v. Baskin, 766
F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) (declining to hear a
Seventh Circuit decision supporting marriage equality); Herbert v. Kitchen, 755
F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014) (declining to hear a
Tenth Circuit decision supporting marriage equality).
14 The Court granted certiorari in three other cases decided by the Sixth Circuit
which raised the same legal issues: Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (involving a
Tennessee ban); Deboer v. Synder, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (involving a Michigan ban);
and Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S. Ct. 1041 (involving a Kentucky ban). The Court
consolidated the four cases and limited its review to the following questions: (1)
"Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between
two people of the same sex?" and (2) "Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a
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bans unconstitutional and also held that states may not refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages performed in other states. 55 The Court noted:
... the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-
sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that
they abridge central precepts of equality. Here the
marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence
unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the benefits
afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from
exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long
history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to
same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and
continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays
and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them....
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the
right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the
liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right
and that liberty.56
While Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell were significant steps
forward and were heralded by civil rights advocates, they do not extend the
same protection to LGBTQ persons that U.S. constitutional law offers other
groups. As things currently stand, the Court has never found sexual
orientation (or gender identity) to be a suspect or a quasi-suspect
classification, which would subject distinctions on this basis to the highest
level of constitutional review or at least intermediate review. Under strict
scrutiny, the most demanding level of review, a governmental classification
must serve a compelling state interest and the means employed to achieve
state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their
marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?" See Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
51 135 S. Ct. at 2605, 2607-08.
56 135 S. Ct. at 2604. The Court articulated four reasons why marriage is a
fundamental right and noted that these reasons apply with equal force to same-sex
and opposite-sex couples: (1) the "right to personal choice regarding marriage is
inherent in the concept of individual liberty;" (2) the right to marry "supports a
two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals;"
(3) marriage "safeguards children and families;" and (4) marriage is a "keystone of
our social order." 135 S. Ct. at 2599-2602.
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that interest must be narrowly tailored.57 Under intermediate scrutiny, the
challenged decision must further an important governmental interest and
utilize means that are substantially related to that interest. 58 Instead of
employing strict or intermediate scrutiny in Lawrence and Windsor, the Court
applied a sort of "heightened" rational basis level of review (the lowest level
of review with a bit of added bite). Under that standard, the government
merely has to set forth a rational basis for its decision to treat a class of
citizens differently, which in Lawrence and Windsor it could not do.59
In Obergefell, while the Court found that state bans on same-sex
marriage violate both due process and equal protection principles secured by
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court did not clearly set forth the governing
standard or framework that it employed in reaching this result. In other words,
it did not clarify what level of scrutiny applies to decisions based on sexual
identity.60 In addition, the opinion is narrowly focused on marriage equality
and does not address the pervasive and ongoing discrimination that LGBTQ
persons continue to face in other areas.
These omissions are important because, without protected class
status, LGBTQ persons remain vulnerable to discriminatory actions by
governmental actors (particularly at the state level) in a variety of settings,
including employment, interactions with the criminal justice system, and the
provision of goods and services. 61 To be sure, the Court is making progress
in the area of LGBTQ rights. But, like the Court's "with all deliberate speed"
approach in the second Brown v. Board of Education decision, 62 the present
51 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2716-17 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 201, 720 (2007)).
58 Id. Intermediate scrutiny is often applied to gender-based classifications. See
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
" Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594.
60 Justice Kennedy hints at the possibility that such bans may be an unlawful form
of sex-based discrimination, but he does not explicitly endorse this view. See 135
S. Ct. at 2603 (noting that "sex-based classifications in marriage remained
common through the mid-20th century" and that "[t]hese classifications denied the
equal dignity of men and women").
61 See Marcia Coyle and Tony Mauro, Marriage Ruling Historic, But Not Final
Word on Gay Rights, NAT'L L. J. (June 29, 2015) (discussing limitations of
Obergefell and some of the remaining challenges for LGBTQ persons); Erik
Eckholm, Next Fight for Gay Rights: Bias in Jobs and Housing, N.Y. TIMES (June
27, 2015) (same), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/us/gay-rights-
leaders-push-for-federal-civil-rights-protections.html?_r=0.
62 In Brown I, decided in 1954, the Supreme Court invalidated the principle of
separate but equal that had been established roughly six decades earlier in Plessy v.
Ferguson. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that
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Court has, at least until Obergefell, seemed satisfied taking an incremental
approach regarding the constitutional rights of LGBTQ persons.63
On the statutory front, the rights of LGBTQ persons also continue to
be inadequately protected. Strong arguments can be made that discrimination
against lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals 64 on the basis of sexual
orientation is a form of normative gender stereotyping (e.g., men should not
love men) and is per se based on sex (e.g., a woman who loves a man is not
penalized in the same way as a man who loves a man).65 Yet, U.S. courts
have not generally included discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
within Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. 66 Courts have relied
segregation in public education violated the plaintiffs' equal protection rights);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana statute
mandating separate railway cars for Whites and Blacks). However, a year later, in
Brown II, the Court stated that implementation of a remedial plan for the
constitutional violation it had recognized in Brown I should occur "with all
deliberate speed"-rather than immediately-given the need to deal with varied
local conditions. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
63 To be sure, there may be advantages to this approach. Changes in public opinion
and the trend in the lower courts in favor of sexual equality may have influenced
the Court's ruling in Obergefell. Interestingly, in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy may
have signaled that the time for "all deliberate speed" was over with regard to the
rights of LGBTQ persons. In response to the Sixth Circuit's argument that it would
be "appropriate ... to await further public discussion and political measures before
licensing same-sex marriage," Justice Kennedy notes that "there has been far more
deliberation than this argument acknowledges." 135 S. Ct. at 2605. He goes on to
point out that "when the rights of persons are violated, 'the Constitution requires
redress by the courts,' notwithstanding the more general value of democratic
decisiomaking... This holds true even when protecting individual rights affects
issues of the utmost importance and sensitivity." Id.; but see 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting (arguing that "stealing this issue from the people will for
many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage, making a dramatic social change that
much more difficult to accept")).
64 1 omit transgender and queer here in order to avoid conflating the diverse
concerns and in some cases differing challenges faced by members of LGBTQ
communities. See supra note 44.
65 For analogous reasoning in a case involving interracial relationships, see Parr v.
Woodmen, 791 F.2d 888 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (finding employer's refusal to hire the
plaintiff because he had a spouse of a different race to be a form of prohibited race
discrimination under Title VII).
66 See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211,217 (2d Cir. 2005);
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001);
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated
by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing same-sex harassment claim based on gender stereotyping).
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upon a textual analysis, noting that Title VII does not explicitly include
sexual orientation in its list of protected classifications and that "sex" for
purposes of Title VII means biologically driven differences between men and
women. 67 Courts have also relied upon legislative history, concluding that
Congress did not intend to protect sexual orientation when Title VII was
initially enacted.68 (This argument is of course analytically flawed given that
courts have read Title VII to include sexual harassment and gender
stereotyping claims, neither of which, arguably, was contemplated by
Congress in 1964.)69 Although Congress has come increasingly closer to
enacting the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA),7 ° with the
Senate voting to pass this Act in 2013, few expect this or similar legislation
to pass the House of Representatives and to make it to President Obama's
desk, particularly given the Republican Party's control of both the House and
the Senate through 2016. This lack of statutory protection for LGBTQ
persons exists despite the efforts of gay rights advocates and despite the
increasing acceptance of LGBTQ persons by non-LGBTQ Americans,
particularly younger Americans. 7
1
67 See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984)
(holding that Title VII does not protect transsexuals, and noting that "[i]f the term
sex as it is used-in Title VII is to mean more than biological male or biological
female, the new definition must come from Congress.").
68 See, e.g., id at 1086; see also DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329 (holding that Congress
did not intend "sex" in Title VII to include "sexual orientation").
69 See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir.
2004) (recognizing gender stereotyping claim); see also Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (noting that "statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed").
70 The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) would prohibit
discrimination based upon sexual orientation, among other things, and has been
introduced several times in Congress. To date, this legislation has failed to pass
both houses of Congress. For an overview of ENDA's history, see Amanda Terkel,
ENDA Vote: Senate Votes to Outlaw LGBT Workplace Discrimination,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/07/enda-vote-n_4228502.html
(discussing the Senate's most recent action on ENDA, but predicting difficulties in
the House); Human Rights Campaign, Employment Non-Discrimination Act:
Legislative Timeline, available at
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/employment-non-discrimination-act-
legislative-timeline.
7" See Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize Gay Marriage in 50 States
(July 29, 2013), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/163730/back-law-
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To be sure, there has been notable progress within the executive
branch. For example in July 2014, President Obama signed Executive Order
13672, which amends previous executive orders and prohibits discrimination
on the basis of gender identity as well as sexual orientation. 72 In December
2014, the Department of Justice announced that its position in future litigation
would be that "Title VII ... extends to claims of discrimination based on an
individual's gender identity, including transgender status. ' 73 And, in July
2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) took a major
step forward in protecting the rights of LGBTQ persons by ruling that
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII. 74 In Baldwin v. Department of
Transportation, the EEOC found that "sexual orientation is inherently a 'sex-
based consideration,' and an allegation of discrimination based on sexual
orientation is necessarily an allegation of sex discrimination under Title
legalize-gay-marriage-states.aspx (examining opinion poll data across
demographic groups).
72 See News Release, The White House, Executive Order-Further Amendments to
Executive Order 11478, Equal Employment Opportunity in the Federal
Government, and Executive Order 11246, Equal Employment Opportunity,
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/21/executive-
order-further-amendments-executive-order- 1478-equal-employmen.
73 This was a reversal from a position that the DOJ had taken in 2006. News
Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General Holder Directs Department
to Include Gender Identity Under Sex Discrimination Employment Claims (Dec.
18, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attomey-general-holder-
directs-department-include-gender-identity-under-sex-discrimination.
74 Baldwin v. Dep't of Transp., EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 15, 2015),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had already taken the position that
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of transgender identity. The EEOC
had also previously stated that discrimination against lesbian, gay, and bisexual
workers based on sex stereotypes (e.g., beliefs that men should love only women
or that women should love only men) is a form of sex discrimination under Title
VII. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, What You Should
Know: EEOC and Enforcement Protections for LGBT Workers, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/enforcement protections_lgbt-workers
.cfm; Macy v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (Apr. 20, 2010)
(accepting Title VII transgender identity claim), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0 120120821%2OMacyo2Ov% 2ODOJ%20ATF.txt;
Veretto v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC DOC 0120110873 (July 1, 2011)
(accepting Title VII sexual orientation claim), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120110873.txt.
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VII."'75 The Commission reasoned that sexual orientation discrimination is
sex discrimination because "it involve[s] treatment that would not have
occurred but for the individual's sex; because it [is] based on the sex of the
person(s) the individual associates with; and/or because it [is] premised on
the fundamental sex stereotype, norm, or expectation that individuals should
be attracted only to those of the opposite sex."76
The President's actions and those of the DOJ and the EEOC grant
greater protection to LGBTQ persons who are employed by the federal
government or by federal contractors.77 Although private employers are not
technically bound by these actions, these developments are nonetheless
significant for plaintiffs in private sector cases. For example, one can expect
that some courts will defer to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII in cases
involving private employers. 78 In addition, plaintiffs desiring to sue private
employers can now expect that the EEOC will more likely find cause in cases
alleging sexual orientation discrimination and that the EEOC may choose to
litigate some of these claims.
These developments are indeed positive. However, the lack of explicit
statutory protection under Title VII (or a statute like ENDA) and the absence
of protected class status for constitutional purposes leave LGBTQ persons
7' Baldwin v. Dep't of Transp., EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, at 6 (July 15,
2015), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf.76 Id. at 14.
77 Baldwin applies to federal employee claims as the case involved the
Commission's review of a federal agency determination. The case was brought by
a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) employee who alleged that he had been
discriminated against because he was gay. After the FAA dismissed the complaint,
the employee appealed to the EEOC. Id. at 1.
78 To be sure, some courts may disagree based upon an absence of Congressional
intent. That is, some courts may read Congress' failure to pass ENDA as evidence
that Congress does not intend to prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation in federal statutory law. See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001). Indeed, the weakest part of the EEOC's
reasoning in Baldwin is on this point. The Commission argues that "the Supreme
Court has ruled that '[c]ongressional inaction lacks persuasive significance
because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction,
including the inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered
change."' Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, at 13. The problem with this
reasoning is that this is not an area where Congress has failed to act by doing
nothing. Congress considered ENDA and the Act's sponsors were unable to
secure enough votes to pass the legislation (although they came very close the last
time around). This suggests that far from being neutral or agnostic on the issue,
Congress (at least a Republican-controlled Congress) does not want to protect
against discrimination based upon sexual orientation.
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vulnerable to discriminatory acts by state-level governmental employers and
private employers. Importantly, an impediment for both constitutional and
statutory law appears to be a general reluctance to expand the number of
protected classifications in U.S. anti-discrimination law.7 9 This reluctance is
heightened by a belief among some policy makers that sexual orientation 80 is
different from race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Historically, U.S.
courts have relied upon four factors as gatekeepers to protected status: (1)
immutability; (2) visibility; (3) relevancy; and (4) a pervasive history of
discrimination. 81 Although the appropriateness of employing some of these
factors has been persuasively challenged, their continued use demonstrates
an unwillingness to depart from previous analytical models once these
models have become entrenched, and a reluctance to engage in the sort of
context-specific analysis required to root out various forms of
discrimination. 82 These factors may influence popular and judicial
understandings of sexual orientation as many Americans still seem to believe
that sexual orientation is not innate and others maintain that it does not have
to be rendered visible-thus, in their minds, differentiating sexual orientation
from other protected classifications such as race and gender.
The poverty of these arguments is readily apparent. For example, and
as others have noted, immutability should be abandoned as a gatekeeper to
protected status. 83 To be sure, few would contest the unfairness of penalizing
persons for traits they cannot change. The immutability theory, however,
implies that decisions based on mutable traits are somehow less pernicious
and therefore merit less attention, presumably because groups can escape
harm by electing to change the trait. Yet, as Professor Kenji Yoshino has
observed, "Jews generally can change or conceal their religion, while blacks
79 However, as the EEOC points out in Baldwin, treating sexual orientation
discrimination as sex discrimination does not require an expansion of protected
categories. Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, at 14.
8 Here, I focus only on sexual orientation to avoid conflating discrimination based
on sexual orientation and discrimination based on gender identity. See supra note
44.
81 Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REv.
135, 146 (2011).
82 Analytical inflexibility and shortcuts may also be used as convenient covers for
animus and hostility toward marginalized groups.
13 Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 490,
493-98, 505 (1998) (critiquing judicial reliance on immutability and visibility).
See also Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology." A
Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 503 (1994);
Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1994).
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generally cannot change or conceal their race. This surely does not make anti-
Semitic legislation more legitimate than racist legislation.58 4
Even assuming arguendo that lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons could
change their orientation, 81it does not follow that they should do so. Indeed,
the suggestion that sexual minorities should change or hide their orientation
to avoid discrimination violates what has been referred to as the "new
immutability," a theoretical approach that would protect traits that "society
deems too important to ask anyone to change,"8 6 or to conceal.
B. Implicit Bias, Structural Discrimination, and the Requirement of
Intent
In addition to failing to provide adequate protection for LGBTQ
persons, U.S. anti-discrimination law has focused on proof of intent in order
to establish a discrimination claim. Yet, as U.S. society has come to embrace
an anti-discrimination norm (in theory), such proof is increasingly difficult to
find as individuals either cover their motives or are driven by subconscious
or implicit bias. 7 A focus on intent, and an approach that views
84 Yoshino, supra note 83, at 505.
8 Importantly, the majority in Obergefell seemed to accept that sexual orientation
is immutable. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (noting "[o]nly in more recent years
have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal
expression of human sexuality and immutable"). Some within the scientific and
broader community, however, continue to challenge this conclusion. See, e.g.,
David Masci, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Americans Are Still Divided On Why
People Are Gay (Mar. 6, 2015), available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/03/06/americans-are-still-divided-on-why-people-are-gay/.
86 Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REv. 303, 377-78
(2014); see also Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV.
1495, 1412-19 (2009) (examining the "new immutability"). In short, the
immutability analysis misses the mark because the ability or inability of a group to
avoid negative action reveals little about whether that action is legitimate and
whether a group merits protection. As the "new immutability" theorists posit, the
immutability analysis also ignores the costs of conversion, or changing one's
status. As Professor Yoshino notes, change or conversion may not be a real option
for those who will see the loss associated with a change of status as greater than
the gains from escaping discrimination. Yoshino, supra note 83, at 510. Thus, any
suggestion that LGBTQ persons should change or cover their identity, if that were
indeed possible, includes an implicit, perhaps unconscious, belief that their current
identity lacks value or positive meaning, which is untrue.
87 See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BL[NDSPOT:
HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013) (examining the development and
application of implicit biases); IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 25, 45, 61
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discrimination as individually motivated, isolated acts, also fails to address
embedded structural barriers and mechanisms that produce disparate
employment outcomes along lines of race and gender.
In early Title VII cases, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to
acknowledge the difficulties inherent in an intent-based model when it
allowed plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing
a statistically significant disparity between an employer's workforce and the
relevant labor market. In Hazehvood School District v. United States88 and
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 89 the Court allowed
an inference of intentional discrimination to be drawn from such disparities.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Company,90 the Court went even farther by
declining to require that plaintiffs establish intent. In that case, the employer
utilized a high school diploma requirement and intelligence tests that
produced a disparate impact on racial minorities. In invalidating these
requirements, the Court observed that Title VII "proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation."91 Further, the Court stated that "intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability... Congress directed the thrust of the
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation." 92 Thus, facially neutral criteria that produce a disparate impact
on protected groups were prohibited if they were not job-related and were not
consistent with an employer's legitimate business needs.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress cleared up any uncertainty
about whether Title VII embraced disparate impact theory by adding specific
language to the statute codifying the theory.93 Yet, disparate impact claims
are still subject to question and debate. To be sure, the Supreme Court has
long held that a showing of impact alone is insufficient to establish a
constitutional violation.94 Thus, plaintiffs bringing equal protection
challenges against state actors must offer additional proof to show intentional
discrimination. In recent years, however, members of the Court have
(Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (examining the impact of
implicit biases in various areas of the law).
88 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
89 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
90 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
91 401 U.S. at 431-32.
92 Id. at 432.
93 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(k) (2013).
94 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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displayed skepticism about whether Title VII's statutory inclusion of
disparate impact theory can survive constitutional challenge.
This point was made most clearly in the 2009 case of Ricci v.
DeStefano.9 5 In that case, the city of New Haven, Connecticut, administered
a test to determine who, among its firefighters, would be eligible for
promotion to the position of lieutenant or captain. 96 When the test produced
a disparate impact on minority firefighters, the city threw out the results. 97
Seventeen White firefighters and one Latino firefighter, all of whom had
passed the test, then sued the city alleging that they had been subject to
intentional discrimination because the city had relied upon race in deciding
not to utilize the test results.98 The city acknowledged in its defense that it
had tossed the test because of its impact on minority firefighters and because
the city feared that, had it used the test, the city would have been subject to a
claim of disparate impact discrimination.99 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court was
called upon to resolve the question of whether an employer is liable under
Title VII's prohibition of intentional discrimination if the employer refuses
to use the results of a screening device that produces a disparate impact on a
protected group. The Court, in a 5-4 split opinion, responded that an employer
would not be liable if it had a strong basis in evidence to believe that a
disparate impact claim would be brought against it. 00 Because New Haven
lacked such a basis, the Court found for the plaintiffs.' 0 ' Significantly, Justice
Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he stated that the Court's
"resolution of this dispute merely postpones the evil day on which the Court
will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the
disparate-impact provisions of Title VII ... consistent with the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection?"'1 2 He noted that "the war between disparate
impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us
to begin thinking about how-and on what terms-to make peace between
them."' °3 Justice Scalia seems to believe that impact cases are
95 557 U.S. 557 (2009).96 Id. at 562.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 563.
99 Id. at 570.
... Id. at 585. The dissenting justices argued that the "strong basis in evidence"
standard would eviscerate voluntary efforts at compliance with Title VII by in
effect requiring employers to prove that they had engaged in disparate impact
discrimination before being allowed to discontinue use of a device with a disparate
impact. Id. at 608.
'o' Id. at 592.
102 Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 594-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
[Vol. 6
Title VII at 50
constitutionally invalid, even within the statutory realm, given that they do
not require that plaintiffs establish intentional discrimination.
In June 2015, in Texas Department of Housing and Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,'0 4 the Court, in another 5-4
split opinion, seemed to breathe new air into disparate impact theory, as least
regarding claims under the federal Fair Housing Act. 105 Relying on the logic
of Griggs and other Title VII cases, the Court recognized the continuing
viability of disparate impact theory under the FHA. 10 6 The Court, however,
placed a number of restrictions on its use, noting that disparate impact theory
may raise "serious constitutional questions,' 0 7 for example, if "liability were
imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical disparity."' 0 8 To guard
against such concerns and to "protect potential defendants against abusive
disparate-impact claims,"'1 9 the Court held that a racial imbalance, without
more, would be insufficient to support a claim. 10 The Court instructed lower
courts to carefully scrutinize disparate impact claims in the early stages of a
lawsuit and to ensure that plaintiffs have established a causal connection
between the challenged practices and the identified disparate effects."' In
addition, the Court stated that remedial orders should "concentrate on the
elimination of the offending practice" through the use of "race-neutral
means" should additional measures be required.' 1
2
The above limitations came from the majority opinion. Writing in
dissent, Justice Alito echoed many of the sentiments set forth by the majority
and by Justice Scalia in Ricci.' 3 Relying on the statutory phrase "because of'
(which also appears in the main prohibition of Title VII), Justice Alito argued
that a disparate impact alone cannot give rise to liability under the Fair
Housing Act."14 Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, went even farther,
chastising the majority for its reliance on Griggs v. Duke Power Company,
104 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
105 135 S. Ct. 2513 ("[t]he question presented for the Court's determination is
whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act").
106 135 S. Ct. 2516-19 (discussing the Court's prior interpretation of Title VII in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and Smith v. City of Jackson).
107 Id. at 2522.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 2524.
"1]Od. at 2523.
III d.
112 Id.
1"3 Id. at 2532 (Alito, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 2533-35.
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noting that "[w]e should drop the pretense that Griggs' interpretation of Title
VII ... was legitimate."' 15
These developments are dire and alarming. The importance of
disparate impact theory cannot be overstated. If employers in a police
department, automobile manufacturing facility, or construction company,
among others, do not believe that women ought to be employed in their
organizations, they are unlikely to post signs saying "women need not apply"
or to express such sentiments in documents, emails, or texts. Even if these
employers do not consciously desire to exclude women, they may be
influenced by unconscious beliefs and biases-those shared ideas and
attitudes about groups that are tacitly conveyed through our common history
and cultural heritage. In a world where many persons with animus against
certain groups will hide their prejudice and employ sophisticated means to
cloak it, or be unaware that it exists, statistical disparities are an effective way
to smoke out discreet or unconscious discriminators. Even if no conscious or
unconscious motive exists, to the extent that a goal of anti-discrimination law
is to ensure the inclusion of groups that have too long suffered on the
periphery of opportunity by eliminating systems and structures that produce
grossly unequal outcomes without apparent justification, then disparate
impact theory is necessary. Unfortunately, in the United States, a substantive
equality or results-oiented approach to opportunity seems to be at odds with
a capitalist economic system that depends upon hierarchy, and appears to be
antithetical to a social ideology founded on the American Dream and widely
held beliefs that individuals control their own destinies more than, in fact,
they do.
C. Formalism
The reluctance to redress sexual orientation and gender identity
discrimination fully and the apparent retreat from disparate impact theory
pose considerable ongoing challenges for anti-discrimination advocates in
the United States. Yet, another problem has also emerged which has
considerable implications for corrective and distributive justice. Over the last
fifty years, U.S. anti-discrimination law has embraced a theory of formal
equality, where the goal is to treat everyone (men and women, people of color
and whites, religious majorities and minorities) the same. Any deviation from
this formalism appears to be immediately suspect.
To be sure, a commitment to formal equality is a good starting point
and has led to some progress. Indeed, one could argue that formalism
produced the result in Obergefell v. Hodges (i.e., that same-sex marriage must
"' Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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be treated the same as opposite-sex marriage).1 16 Yet, formalism alone may
be insufficient. As the Supreme Court pointed out as early as Griggs v. Duke
Power Company, treating differently situated people the same does not
necessarily produce equality of opportunity or equity. 117 Unfortunately, for
some formal equality has become both the starting point and the ending point
of contemporary discrimination analyses, as demonstrated by Chief Justice
Roberts in a recent case in which the Court found that the use of race by
school districts seeking to integrate public schools was unlawful. In his
plurality opinion, Justice Roberts stated that "[t]he way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 8 In
another case, involving affirmative action, Justice Clarence Thomas took a
similarly formalistic view. In rejecting the use of race-based affirmative
action measures, Justice Thomas stated that "[i]n [his] mind, government-
sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious
as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is racial
discrimination, plain and simple." ' 19 Thus, in the minds of these justices, not
only is the dissimilar treatment of racial groups per se unlawful, but the
justifications for such dissimilar treatment are (at least for Justice Thomas)
seemingly irrelevant.
Justice Stevens has pointed to limitations inherent in reasoning of this
kind. In Adarand, he noted:
[t]he Court's concept of "consistency" assumes that there
is no significant difference between a decision by the
majority to impose a special burden on the members of a
minority race and a decision by the majority to provide a
benefit to certain members of that minority
notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members
of the majority. In my opinion that assumption is
untenable. There is no moral or constitutional
equivalence between a policy that is designed to
perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate
racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an
engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to
enhance or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial
race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse: a
116 Obergefell v. Hodges is discussed supra at pages 12-13.
" 7 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
18 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007).
119 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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desire to foster equality in society. No sensible
conception of the Government's constitutional obligation
to "govern impartially," should ignore this distinction.' 20
The rigid adherence to formal equality, which is both ahistorical and
acontextual, 121 has been used not only to thwart affirmative action measures
and measures designed to foster greater racial integration; it has also been
used to undermine initiatives that would lead to greater participation by
120 Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens went on to observe:
The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the
difference between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome
mat. It would treat a Dixiecrat Senator's decision to vote
against Thurgood Marshall's confirmation in order to keep
African Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with
President Johnson's evaluation of his nominee's race as a
positive factor. It would equate a law that made black citizens
ineligible for military service with a program aimed at
recruiting black soldiers. An attempt by the majority to exclude
members of a minority race from a regulated market is
fundamentally different from a subsidy that enables a
relatively small group of newcomers to enter that market. An
interest in "consistency" does not justify treating differences as
though they were similarities.
Id. at 245.
21 Justice Stevens has also pointed to the importance of contextual analysis. In
Parents Involved, he criticized Chief Justice Roberts' characterization of Brown v.
Board of Education, noting:
The first sentence in the concluding paragraph of [Justice
Roberts'] opinion states: "Before Brown, schoolchildren were
told where they could and could not go to school based on the
color of their skin." This sentence reminds me of Anatole
France's observation: "[T]he majestic equality of the la[w],..
• forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg
in the streets, and to steal their bread." The Chief Justice fails
to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so
ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white
children struggling to attend black schools. In this and other
ways, The Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this
Court's most important decisions.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
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women in the workforce. For example, a commitment to formalism has been
employed to counter efforts to require that employers make necessary
adjustments for workers experiencing complications from pregnancy. 122 This
was demonstrated recently in Young v. United Parcel Service, a case
involving a UPS employee who requested a workplace accommodation in
order to avoid lifting heavy items during her pregnancy. 123 The employer
accommodated some nonpregnant workers with similar limitations, but not
all such workers. In interpreting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which
amended Title VII to include pregnancy within the definition of sex
discrimination, 24 the U.S. Supreme Court held that while Title VII requires
equal treatment (i.e., that employers accommodate pregnant women to the
extent that they accommodate nonpregnant workers with similar restrictions),
such accommodation is not required if the employer refuses to accommodate
pregnant workers and some subgroup of nonpregnant workers for
nondiscriminatory reasons.125 In other words, the statute did not require that
122 See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856 (5th Cir. 2002);
Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994); Marafino v. St.
Louis Cty. Circuit Court, 707 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983); see also California Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-89 (1987) (finding that Title VII
allows, but does not require, the preferential treatment of pregnant workers).
123 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015).
124 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) added section 701(k) to Title VII.
See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/pregnancy.cfm (discussing the PDA's history);
Young v. United Parcel Serv., 135 S. Ct. at 1344-45 (same). Section 701(k) reads,
in part:
the terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). In Young, the Court was asked to interpret the second clause
of section 701(k) in a context where the employer accommodated many, but not
all, workers with nonpregnancy-related disabilities. 135 U.S. at 1344. Thus, the
question arose as to which "other persons" pregnant women were to be compared.
125 Importantly, the Court also found that neutral justifications offered to explain a
failure to accommodate pregnant women could be challenged, noting,
[w]e believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by
providing sufficient evidence that the employer's policies
2014]
Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review
pregnant women be afforded "most favored nation status" or that they be
treated better than those nonpregnant workers who were not
accommodated. 126
Oddly enough, formalism has produced other interesting claims in
recent years, including assertions by workers without children that they are
subject to discrimination-or a new form of parental status discrimination-
because of the presence of family-friendly workplace policies (e.g.,
alternative work arrangements, leave policies, and dependent-care and other
benefits designed to appeal to parents). 127 In short, these workers are asserting
that they are being forced to work longer hours (e.g., overtime, holidays, and
weekends) for less pay and fewer benefits than their colleagues with children,
and that this violates the principle of equal treatment, or equal pay for equal
work.12 8 Significantly, only an overly formalistic and acontextual approach
would give these arguments any resonance.
impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the
employer's 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory' reasons are not
sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather-when
considered along with the burden imposed-give rise to an
inference of intentional discrimination.... The plaintiff can
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a
significant burden exists by providing evidence that the
employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant
workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of
pregnant workers.
135 S. Ct. at 1354.
126 Id. at 1349-50.
127 Such policies would include part-time, flextime, and compressed work weeks;
maternity, paternity, and other forms of family leave; and on-site childcare centers,
vouchers to subsidize childcare costs, and tuition benefits, among other things.
128 For additional discussion of parental status discrimination from the viewpoint of
childfree persons, see TRINA JONES, Single and Childfree! Reassessing Parental
and Marital Status Discrimination, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1255 (2014). In short, I argue
that if one accepts anti-subordination as a key objective of anti-discrimination law,
then merely treating childless workers differently from parents does not lead
inexorably to the conclusion that discrimination is occurring. While the argument
of childless workers seems persuasive at first glance, one must evaluate the
purposes being served by the policies about which childless workers complain
before advocating for their abolishment. To be sure, policies and practices based on
generalized assumptions about the benefits of parenting should not go
unchallenged. To the extent, however, that employer actions are implemented to
eliminate the continued subordination and marginalization of women in the
workplace, they should be maintained. Practices that serve legitimate public ends
[Vol. 6
Title VII at 50
In summary, the analysis in this section reveals that U.S. courts have
developed a rather limited understanding of discrimination and that doctrinal
analysis has, in some cases, veered dangerously off course. This essay
maintains that discrimination is not simply treating individuals differently.
By the same token, equal opportunity may not be satisfied merely by treating
everyone the same. One must always ask the additional question of why
dissimilar treatment is occurring or is required. Asking this question
necessarily invites an important and critical conversation about the goals of
anti-discrimination law-a discussion that involves corrective and
distributive justice. Unfortunately, on the fiftieth anniversary of the CRA, it
is that conversation that many Americans, including some members of the
judiciary, seem no longer interested in having.
D. Why Are We Here?
In reflecting on the last fifty years, one might ask: why has U.S. anti-
discrimination law lost much of its forward momentum, and what are possible
implications for the future? A partial response to the first question may be the
intractability of deeply-rooted norms, which include embedded beliefs about
the desirability and inherent capabilities of various groups. But part of the
answer may also be temporal. The United States is fifty years from a system
of de jure segregation and in-your-face discrimination. The passage of time
renders it more difficult for the U.S. public, whose median age is 37, to see
and to understand the ways in which modem discrimination happens.
Arguments based on numerical disparities inevitably encounter America's
social ideology, which is based upon rugged individualism and the American
Dream. The idea is that with individual effort anyone can pull herself up by
her bootstraps and achieve economic prosperity. The fact that socio-
economic mobility and the American Dream are largely unobtainable for
masses of people is, of course, ignored or dismissed.
Another related response to the question of why U.S. anti-
discrimination law is at a standstill is that Americans want to believe that we
are post-race, post-sex, and post-everything else. This is an understandable
impulse given this country's messy and extensive history of discrimination.
It is simply more pleasant and easier all around to think that we are, or have
obtained, our better selves, than to continue the hard and challenging work of
grappling with our continuing imperfections.
may have adverse effects for subsets of workers (i.e., workers without children).
These effects can be minimized by hiring additional workers, by making certain
benefits available to all workers, and by paying workers additional compensation
or offering comparable time off when they are required to do extra work.
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And finally, there is a question of power. Real inclusion-like
accepting the browning of America-means that, inevitably, those with the
strongest hold on existing power structures will face competition and a
potential diminution of their influence. History, not just in the U.S. but around
the world, has shown that power is rarely voluntarily relinquished. Moreover,
power that is threatened, whether materially or psychologically, often strikes
back.
In this climate, "discrimination fatigue," or an unwillingness to be
receptive to existing claims of discrimination or to an expansion of protected
classifications, is understandable, though thoroughly unacceptable. An
embrace of formal equality, which has some value but does not go far enough
in bridging opportunity gaps, is also understandable, though ultimately
inadequate.
CONCLUSION
In many ways, the U.S. workplace in 2015 is very different from the
workplace in 1964. Although Title VII has not eradicated all discrimination,
it has affected employee demographics and influenced the ways in which
Americans conceptualize the roles and capabilities of women and people of
color. For these reasons, Title VII and the legions of courageous plaintiffs,
lawyers, policy makers, and other activists who worked tirelessly to
implement its promise deserve to be celebrated. Yet, Americans should be
careful not to become blinded by celebratory zeal. While it is appropriate,
and indeed desirable and encouraging, to look back and to acknowledge the
slow and steady progress Title VII has produced, Americans must recognize
that there is still much work to be done before full equality of opportunity is
realized. As this essay has demonstrated, anti-discrimination advocates must
continue to struggle against those who would refuse to extend full legal
coverage to LGBTQ persons. They must resist the use of analytical
techniques that fail to recognize the ways in which groups are differently
situated and the discreet and subtle ways in which discrimination is practiced.
Above all, they must continue to press for greater discussion and a more
complex understanding of the differences between equality and equity, and
dissimilar treatment and discrimination.
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